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COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES V. MENDEZ:
DEFENDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
“PROVOCATION RULE”
Layal Bishara*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures
the right of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”1
Additionally, it ensures that “no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”2 This amendment has been a cornerstone in the discussion on
law enforcement and its use of force, abuse of power, and the
interaction between the police and the public. Recently, the Supreme
Court of the United States weighed in on this discussion in County of
Los Angeles v. Mendez.3 On May 30, 2017, the Court overruled in part
and remanded in part the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Mendez v. County
of Los Angeles.4
In Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit held that
police officers can be sued when they use reasonable force if they have
unlawfully entered a premises in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
thereby violating an individual’s right to privacy; this is known as the
“Provocation Rule.”5 The Provocation Rule provides that “if a police
officer recklessly promotes a potentially violent confrontation with a
Fourth Amendment violation, the officer is liable for any injury caused
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., International
Relations and Political Science, University of Southern California, 2015. Thanks to Professor
Simona Grossi for her invaluable feedback and unrelenting encouragement throughout the writing
process, to the members of Loyola of Los Angles Law Review for their hard work, and to family
and friends for their support.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Id.
3. 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).
4. 815 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).
5. Id. at 1193–94.
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by a subsequent use of force that results from that confrontation, even
if the use of force itself was reasonable.”6
The Supreme Court overturned this “Rule,” holding it
unconstitutional.7 This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s
decision regarding the constitutionality of the Provocation Rule, and
the question of whether the officers’ use of force and the resulting
injury would have been prevented had the officers secured a search
warrant.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October 2010, an arrest warrant was issued for Ronnie O’Dell,
“who was believed to be armed and dangerous.”8 Officers Conley and
Pederson of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department were
among the officers assigned to capture O’Dell.9 They received a tip
that O’Dell was residing at the home of Paula Hughes in Lancaster,
California, and pursued the tip.10 Officers were instructed to go to the
front door and confront Hughes, and Officers Conley and Pederson
were instructed to go and search the back of the residence.11 The
officers at the front door entered the residence without displaying a
warrant, despite Hughes’s request to see one.12 However, they did not
find O’Dell in the house.13 Meanwhile, Officers Conley and Pederson
were behind the house and found three sheds, one of which was
occupied by Angel Mendez and a pregnant woman, Jennifer Garcia
(now Jennifer Mendez).14 Mendez and Garcia had been living in this
shack in Hughes’s backyard for about 10 months at that time, and
Mendez had built the shed himself.15 The officers were unaware of the
presence of Mendez and Garcia, and entered the shed without a search
warrant, knocking, or announcing themselves.16

6. Radley Balko, SCOTUS Eliminates the ‘Provocation Rule’, THE WASH. POST (May 30,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/05/30/scotus-eliminates-theprovocation-rule/?utm_term=.71cbf6dddfde.
7. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1544.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Mendez and Garcia were inside the shed, napping on a futon.17
When the officers entered, Mendez woke up and picked up a BB gun
he was holding so as to set it down on the floor, as he thought it was
Hughes who had entered the shed.18 Mendez kept this BB gun for
fending off rats and other pests that lived outside.19 The officers assert
that Mendez pointed the gun “somewhat south towards Deputy
Conley,” so they opened fire and fired fifteen rounds, severely injuring
both Mendez and Garcia.20 Mendez’s injuries resulted in the
amputation of his leg.21
Mendez and Garcia filed suit in federal court against the County
of Los Angeles and Officers Conley and Pederson, asserting three
Fourth Amendment claims: (1) “the deputies executed an
unreasonable search by entering the shack without a warrant”; (2) “the
deputies performed an unreasonable search because they failed to
announce their presence before entering the shack”; and (3) “the
deputies effected an unreasonable seizure by deploying excessive
force in opening fire after entering the shack.”22
The District Court found the officers responsible for the first two
claims, failing to announce presence before entering and entering
without a warrant, but found that the officers did not use unreasonable
force since they were under the reasonable belief that a gun was
pointed at them and threatening them.23 However, the District Court
invoked the Ninth Circuit’s “Provocation Rule.”24 The Provocation
Rule holds that “an officer’s otherwise reasonable (and lawful)
defensive use of force is unreasonable as a matter of law, if (1) the
officer intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent response, and (2)
that provocation is an independent constitutional violation.”25
Consequently, “the District Court held the deputies liable for
excessive force and awarded [Mendez] $4 million in damages.”26
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1544–45.
19. Id. at 1544.
20. Id. at 1545.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (holding that use of force was
reasonable if the officers were under a reasonable belief that a firearm was threatening their lives).
24. Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-04771-MWF (PJWx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115099, at *65–66 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013).
25. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1545.
26. Id.
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The County and officers appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part the District
Court’s ruling.27 In pertinent part, the Ninth Circuit ultimately
affirmed the District Court’s interpretation of the Provocation Rule.28
It affirmed that the Provocation Rule only requires “that the deputies’
unconstitutional conduct ‘created a situation which led to the shooting
and required the officers to use force that might have otherwise been
reasonable,’”29 and that here, the officers “recklessly or intentionally”
brought about the shooting by unlawfully entering the shack.30
However, it used a different approach for its analysis, concluding that
“‘basic notions of proximate cause’ would support liability even
without the Provocation Rule because it was ‘reasonably foreseeable’
that the officers would meet an armed homeowner when they ‘barged
into the shack unannounced.’”31
The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari, and on
May 30, 2017, issued an opinion overturning in part and remanding in
part the decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.32
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
In its opinion, the Supreme Court focused on the constitutionality
of the Ninth Circuit’s Provocation Rule.33 Under the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning, the Provocation Rule may apply if police force has been
deemed reasonable by the standards set out in Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386 (1989).34 The rule then “instructs the court to ask whether
the law enforcement officer violated the Fourth Amendment in some
other way in the course of events leading up to the seizure.”35 If there
is a separate Fourth Amendment violation, it may “render the officer’s
otherwise reasonable defensive use of force unreasonable as a matter
of law.”36 To start with, the Court asserted that the definitions of the
27.
(2017).
28.
29.
2010)).
30.
31.
32.
33.
Rule).
34.
35.
36.

Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1539
Id.
Id. at 1193 (quoting Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 539 (9th Cir.
Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1194–95.
Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).
See id. at 1546–49 (discussing the constitutionality of the Ninth Circuit’s Provocation
Id. at 1546–47.
Id. at 1546.
Id. (quoting Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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two claims differ:
an excessive force claim is a claim that a law enforcement
officer carried out an unreasonable seizure through a use of
force that was not justified under the relevant circumstances.
It is not a claim that an officer used reasonable force after
committing a distinct Fourth Amendment violation such as
an unreasonable entry.37
The Court went on to assert that conflating excessive force claims
with other Fourth Amendment claims, as is done through the
Provocation Rule, is incorrect.38 If the elements of an excessive force
claim set out in Graham are not met, then there is no excessive force
claim, and the analysis should end there.39 The analysis for any other
Fourth Amendment claim should be conducted separately.40 The
Court noted that, although the Ninth Circuit attempted to limit the use
of the Provocation Rule “to only those distinct Fourth Amendment
violations that in some sense ‘provoked’ the need to use force,” this
limitation is riddled with problems.41 The test for whether
“provocation” has occurred is (1) “the separate constitutional violation
‘[created] a situation which led to’ the use of force,” and (2) “the
separate constitutional violation must [have been] committed
recklessly or intentionally.”42
The Court held that the first prong of the test, whether the
violation created a situation that led to the use of force, is a “vague
causal standard” that deviates from the normal proximate cause test
that courts are familiar with.43 Additionally, the Court held that the
second prong of the test is a subjective standard looking at the intent
of the officers, while the “reasonableness of a search or seizure is
almost always based on objective factors.”44
The Court further asserted that the purpose of the Provocation
Rule, holding law enforcement “liable for the foreseeable
consequences of all of their constitutional torts,” is one that can be

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1548.
Id. (quoting Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016)).
Id.
Id.
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achieved through other means of the law.45 Even if plaintiffs cannot
seek relief through a claim of excessive force, if the officers entered
unlawfully or without a warrant, they can seek damages on those
claims alone.46
The Court further overturned the Ninth Circuit’s proximate cause
conclusion.47 The Ninth Circuit held that the injury was “proximately
caused” by the warrantless entry of Mendez’s shack.48 Instead of
analyzing the foreseeability of the risk created by the warrantless
entry, as would be proper since the warrantless entry was the
applicable constitutional violation, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the
causal proximity between the “unannounced” entry and the shooting.
The Court held that this was an improper analysis because the officers
were not liable for the “unannounced” entry due to qualified
immunity.49
The Court did not, however, completely dismiss the Ninth
Circuit’s proximate cause theory.50 In fact, it remanded the issue and
ordered the court of appeals to apply a proximate cause analysis to the
applicable violation, which was the warrantless entry.51 The Court
further ordered the Ninth Circuit to apply a traditional proximate cause
analysis to this issue, rather than the “murky causal link” it applied in
its decision.52
IV. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The Provocation Rule was first addressed by the Ninth Circuit in
Alexander v. City & County of San Francisco.53 In Alexander, police
officers and a hostage negotiation team were sent to a man’s house
with a forcible entry inspection warrant due to the resident’s
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 1549.
48. Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct.
1539 (2017).
49. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1549. “Qualified immunity is an immunity from civil suit extended
to police officers, administrators, and other public officials who are alleged to have violated the
rights of a person while the official was performing a discretionary function of office, if the
official’s conduct does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that would
have been known to a reasonable person.” Qualified Immunity, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER
LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2011).
50. See Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1549.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. 29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994).
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unresponsiveness and failure to comply with housing inspection
requests and orders.54 When the officers and negotiators arrived, the
resident, Quade, refused to let them in and threatened to use his gun.55
The officers in turn entered with the intent of arresting him, but Quade
fired his gun and shots were exchanged, resulting in Quade’s death.56
The Ninth Circuit found that if the officers entered Quade’s house with
the intention of arresting him, they violated his Fourth Amendment
rights since they only had an inspection warrant rather than an arrest
warrant.57 The court further found that summary judgment was
inappropriate in regard to whether excessive force was used:
The force which was applied must be balanced against
the need for that force: it is the need for force which is at the
heart of the consideration of the Graham factors. If the jury
were to find that the officers entered in order to help the
inspectors inspect . . . then the jury may also conclude that
the force used . . . was excessive in relation to the purpose for
which it was used . . . . On the other hand, if the jury were to
conclude that the officers entered for the purpose of arresting
Quade, they may conclude that storming the house was in
fact commensurate with need (arresting a man who had
threatened to shoot anyone who came into his house), and
hence that the force was reasonable.58
The lack of an arrest warrant caused reasonable force to become
unreasonable, even if the force used was reasonable in the moment of
the shooting itself.59 By connecting the use of force to the purpose of
entry, the court essentially held that a jury could have found that a lack
of a warrant would have made the force unreasonable since the officers
“used excessive force in creating the situation which caused Quade to
take the actions he did.”60 In finding that a jury could have found that
an unlawful entry led to a situation in which force was provoked, the
court laid the foundation for the Provocation Rule.61

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1358.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1367.
See id. at 1366 n.12.
Id. at 1366.
See id. at 1367.
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In another excessive force case, Billington v. Smith,62 the Ninth
Circuit succinctly interpreted the standard set out in Alexander:
[W]here an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a
violent confrontation, if the provocation is an
independent Fourth Amendment violation, he may be held
liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force.
In Alexander, the officers allegedly used excessive force
because
they
committed
an
independent Fourth
Amendment violation by entering the man’s house to arrest
him without an arrest warrant, for a relatively trivial and nonviolent offense, and this violation provoked the man to shoot
at the officers. Thus, even though the officers reasonably
fired back in self-defense, they could still be held liable for
using excessive force because their reckless and
unconstitutional provocation created the need to use force.63
In Espinosa v. City & County of San Francisco,64 an excessive
force case with facts similar to those in Mendez, the Ninth Circuit
further applied the Provocation Rule.65 Officers entered an attic and
shot a man because one of the officers “believed that he saw something
black in [the man’s] hand that looked like a gun,” even though the man
did not have a weapon or make any threats.66 The court denied the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment because there was
“evidence that the illegal entry created a situation which led to the
shooting and required the officers to use force that might have
otherwise been reasonable.”67 This established that provocation does
not require the act to elicit a violent response from a plaintiff; the
officers simply must act unconstitutionally, and the unconstitutional
act must lead to a shooting or use of deadly force.68
V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s Provocation Rule asserts that “where an
officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if
the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation, he
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1189.
598 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2010).
See id.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 539.
See id.; see also Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016).

51.2_BISHARA_V.7 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

DEFENDING THE “PROVOCATION RULE”

4/5/19 7:08 PM

515

may be held liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force.”69
Liability can attach to officers if their unconstitutional conduct—
unlawful entry, for example—“created a situation which led to the
shooting and required the officers to use force that might have
otherwise been reasonable.”70
In Mendez, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
Provocation Rule for several reasons: (1) the rule conflates two
different Fourth Amendment violations that require two different
analyses; (2) the test used to enforce the “provocation” limitation is
incorrect; and (3) the purpose of the rule, to hold law enforcement
officials liable for their actions, can be achieved through other
means.71 The Court further asserted that the causation analysis
conducted by the Ninth Circuit was incomplete and vague.72 This
Comment analyzes the constitutionality of the Provocation Rule,
namely whether an excessive force claim and an unlawful entry claim
can be analyzed together, and the causal connection between the
unlawful entry and resulting harm in Mendez.
A. Excessive Force Claim Analysis
The analysis for determining whether excessive force has been
used was set out in Graham v. Connor.73 The Court in Graham
established that “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force
must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”74 The Court
held that because “police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation,” the analysis must consider the position and specific
circumstances that the officers may be in.75 As with other analyses that
use the reasonableness standard, in an excessive force analysis, “the
‘reasonableness’ inquiry . . . is an objective one: the question is
whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002).
Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 539.
See Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546–48 (2017).
Id. at 1548–49.
490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Id. at 396.
Id. at 396–97.
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underlying intent or motivation.”76
In assessing reasonableness, the court must also balance the
“extent of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights
against the government’s interest,” i.e., the court must balance the
“force that was used by the officers against the need for such force.”77
In evaluating the government’s interest, courts consider “(1) the
severity of the crime; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate
threat to the officers’ or public’s safety; and (3) whether the suspect
was resisting arrest or attempting to escape.”78 In assessing the extent
of intrusion upon the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, courts
must evaluate “the type and amount of force inflicted.”79 Lastly, courts
“balance the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against the
government’s need for that intrusion.”80 Additionally, “the parties
‘relative culpability’ i.e., which party created the dangerous situation
and which party is more innocent, may also be considered.”81
B. Unlawful Entry Claim Analysis
Although assessing an unlawful entry claim also analyzes
whether the entry was reasonable or unreasonable, “[u]nder the Fourth
Amendment, warrantless searches inside a home are ‘presumptively
unreasonable.’”82 A violation of the knock-and-announce rule will
also constitute an unlawful search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.83 “The most basic constitutional rule in this area is that
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
76. Id. at 397; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that in analyzing the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an
objective standard . . . .”).
77. Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010).
78. Id.; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
79. Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 537 (quoting Miller v. Clark Cty., 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir.
2003)).
80. Id. (quoting Miller, 340 F.3d at 964).
81. Id.
82. Walters v. Freeman, 572 F.App’x 723, 727 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Brigham City v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
83. Lusine Ajdaharian, Knocking Down the “Knock-and-Announce” Rule: A Casenote on
Hudson v. Michigan, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 183, 183 (2007); see 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2012) (“The
officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or
anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is
refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution
of the warrant.”).
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and well delineated exceptions.”84 Such exceptions include exigent
circumstances under which a warrant could not be obtained.85 The
burden of showing exigency rests on the government to “demonstrate
exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of
unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.”86 In
order to show this, the government must prove that “the exigencies of
the situation made that course imperative.”87
Courts have found exigent circumstances that allow a warrantless
entry in situations “where there is danger to human life, [and]
protection of the public becomes paramount and can justify a limited,
warrantless intrusion into the home.”88 Such circumstances also
depend “somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in
progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach
it.”89
C. Similarities Between the Two Analyses
While the analyses for an unlawful entry claim and an excessive
force claim look to different factors and begin with different
presumptions, they share many similarities. The standard in analyzing
both claims is one of reasonableness, i.e., whether the force used was
reasonable or whether the entry without a warrant was reasonable.90
Additionally, both look to the specific circumstances and facts of the
use of force/entry in assessing reasonableness.91 Furthermore, they are
almost always brought within the same action; generally, if a plaintiff
84. Watson v. City of Bonney Lake, 506 F.App’x 555, 557 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971)); see Erwin Chemerinsky, Fourth Amendment
Stops, Arrests, and Seizures in the Context of Qualified Immunity, 25 TOURO L. REV. 781, 791 n.62
(2009) (“[Y]ou are going to have cases where it is obvious that you do not need a case on point
because the language of the statute or the language of the constitutional provision is so clear, and
the conduct is so wrong that anybody would know that this is unlawful.”).
85. See Alexander v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting
that the plaintiff relied on “Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980), in which the Supreme
Court held that absent exigent circumstances, police may not enter a suspect’s home to make a
felony arrest without a warrant.”); see also Callahan v. Millard Cty., 494 F.3d 891, 899 (10th Cir.
2007) (finding that the law was clearly established that without consent or exigent circumstances,
a warrantless entry of the home was unlawful), rev’d on other grounds, 555 U.S. 223.
86. Watson, 506 F.App’x at 558 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984)).
87. Id. at 557 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971)).
88. Hall v. Smith, 170 F.App’x 105, 106 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Holloway,
290 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2002)).
89. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948).
90. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Walters v. Freeman, 572 F.App’x 723,
727 (11th Cir. 2014).
91. See McDonald, 335 U.S. at 459; Graham, 490 U.S. at 398.
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brings an unlawful entry claim, they also bring an excessive force
claim.92 The court in Walters went as far as to assert that “[b]ecause
the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Walters
demonstrate that [the officer’s] entry into her apartment was unlawful,
we must also conclude that they support finding a constitutional
excessive-force violation . . . ‘if an arresting officer does not have the
right to make an arrest, he does not have the right to use any degree of
force in making the arrest.’”93 The same can apply to an unlawful entry
claim, since an unlawful arrest and unlawful entry claim are
essentially the same violation.94
Although seemingly different on their face due to the specific
factors and balancing test for an excessive force claim set out in
Graham, in practice, the analyses of both claims will often lead to the
same outcome, particularly through a proximate cause analysis as
examined below.95 Additionally, the Graham factors require
considering “(1) the severity of the crime; (2) whether the suspect
posed an immediate threat to the officers’ or public’s safety; and (3)
whether the suspect was resisting arrest or attempting to escape.”96 All
of these factors parallel those the court must look at in determining
whether exigent circumstances were present and justified a
warrantless entry.97 If these factors are met, both exigency and
reasonable force would be found, and vice versa.
In Mendez, the Supreme Court was concerned about finding
liability for excessive force based on a successful unlawful entry claim
when an excessive force claim would not have survived on its own.98
Imposing liability on an officer could be a violation of the officer’s
due process rights because the officer would be held liable based on a
92. See, e.g., Walters, 572 F.App’x at 723.; Watson v. City of Bonney Lake, 506 F.App’x 555
(9th Cir. 2013); Bashir v. Rockdale Cty., 445 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006); Alexander v. City & Cty.
of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994).
93. Walters, 572 F.App’x at 729 (quoting Bashir v. Rockdale Cty., 445 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th
Cir. 2006)).
94. See Barragan v. City of Eureka, No. 15-cv-02070-WHO, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118603,
at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016) (holding that an unlawful arrest analysis requires looking to whether
it was “objectively reasonable” to carry out such an arrest by assessing the “totality of the
circumstances”).
95. See infra Section E.
96. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537
(9th Cir. 2010).
97. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948); Hall v. Smith, 170 F.App’x
105, 106 (11th Cir. 2006).
98. Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1547 (2017).
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violation that upon immediate examination, did not occur. However,
as asserted above and as will be discussed in the proximate cause
analysis of the unlawful entry and resulting force, even if the force was
not excessive in the isolated circumstance of the shooting itself, both
the unlawful entry analysis and the excessive force analysis call for an
assessment of all of the surrounding circumstances. 99 Such
circumstances must include the means by which the officer entered the
premises where he used the force in controversy.100
D. Purpose of the Provocation Rule
The principles of the Provocation Rule are familiar with and
similar to basic tort law causation principles. In Monroe v. Pape,101
the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil
remedy for victims of unconstitutional searches and seizures, should
be “read against the background of tort liability that makes a man
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.”102 Similarly,
the Provocation Rule holds police officers liable for the harm caused
by their unlawful entry.103
While excessive force and unlawful entry are two different Fourth
Amendment violations, there are situations in which an unlawful entry
leads to the use of force and resulting injury.104 If constitutional torts
follow the same reasoning as regular tort liability, not only should the
force itself be analyzed, but the events leading up to the use of force
should also be considered.105 Indeed, “[p]olice officers should not be
allowed to create dangerous situations that leave them with no choice
but to use deadly force . . . officers cannot escape liability when their

99. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.
100. See Elie Mystal, The Supreme Court Makes It Even Easier For Cops To Shoot You, ABOVE
THE LAW (May 30, 2017, 1:15 p.m.), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/05/the-supreme-court-makesit-even-easier-for-cops-to-shoot-you/?rf=1.
101. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
102. Id. at 187.
103. See Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1545 (District Court found an officer liable on a warrantless
entry claim, and two deputies liable on a knock-and-announce claim).
104. James Byrd, As a Matter of Law and Policy, the Ninth Circuit’s “Provocation Rule” Must
Stand, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (Feb. 9, 2017), http://harvardcrcl.org/as-a-matter-of-law-andpolicy-the-ninth-circuits-provocation-rule-must-stand-2/.
105. Id. (stating that the provocation rule is partly motivated by the notion that it is important
to hold law enforcement officers liable for the foreseeable consequences of all of their constitutional
torts); see Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f an officer’s provocative
actions are objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, . . . liability is established, and
the question becomes . . . what harms the constitutional violation proximately caused.”).
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own unreasonable conduct leads them to use avoidable force.”106 The
Provocation Rule merely highlights and applies the belief that “the
warrant requirement is preventive rather than remedial.”107 “The
warrant process benefits the innocent, law-abiding citizen because it
provides a check on the government agent’s actions before the agent
conducts an unconstitutional search and seizure,” which almost
undeniably leads to a forceful confrontation at the expense of the
victim of the unconstitutional search or seizure.108
It is only logical that if an entry into a premises is illegal, the
illegality of the entry should have a bearing upon the reasonableness
inquiry of the excessive force claim.109 If the entry is unlawful, officers
are “essentially bait[ing] you into a confrontation.”110 The Provocation
Rule exists as a mechanism for ensuring that the reasonableness of the
entry is factored into the reasonableness of the use of force itself; since
the reasonableness of the excessive force calls for assessing the
circumstances the officers were in at the time,111 the reasonableness of
how they got into the premises where force was used in the first place
is a logical and necessary factor.112
Additionally, the Provocation Rule is a mechanism by which
plaintiffs can seek relief for injuries caused by police force, even if the
force was reasonable at the time of exertion. “[T]hat the Mendezes
failed to establish liability for unreasonable force is inapposite to the
conclusion that the deputies unlawfully entered the Mendezes’
dwelling and thereby caused their injuries.”113 Without the
provocation rule, there is no remedy for the injuries caused by the
illegal entrance. The rule also gives officers an incentive to obtain
warrants, knock, and announce themselves before entering a premises,
thereby avoiding inevitable resulting harm.114
106. Chiraag Bains, After Creating Danger, Can Cops Use Force with Impunity?, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 15, 2017), http://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/06/15/aftercreating-danger-can-cops-use-force-with-impunity#.2FCCjAIMw[http://perma.cc/7MPK-BSKQ]
(last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
107. Donald L. Beci, Fidelity to the Warrant Clause: Using Magistrates, Incentives, and
Telecommunications Technology to Reinvigorate Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U.
L. REV. 293, 310 (1996).
108. Id.
109. Mystal, supra note 100.
110. Id.
111. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
112. See Mystal, supra note 100.
113. Byrd, supra note 104.
114. Id.
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E. The Ninth Circuit’s Causation Analysis
The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit’s causation
analysis was insufficient to warrant a finding of a causal connection
between the entry and resulting force.115 It held that “[p]roper analysis
of this proximate cause question required consideration of the
foreseeability or the scope of the risk created by the predicate conduct,
and required the court to conclude that there was some direct relation
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”116 It
has been established that in analyzing causation of tort claims, an
“actor’s liability [is] limited to those harms that result[] from the risks
that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”117 The Provocation Rule
brings this causation principle into practice in the context of enforcing
Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally, other courts have assessed
and found proximate causation between an unlawful entry and the
resulting harm.118
In applying the Supreme Court’s proper proximate cause analysis
to the facts in Mendez, it is evident that there is a proximate causal
connection between the unlawful entry and the force used, which
ultimately led to the Mendezes’ injuries. The “foreseeability . . . of the
risk created”119 by the unlawful entry was high, considering that the
officers did not know who they would find inside the shack;
consequently, the possibility of surprise to the individual(s) inside was
high due to the officers’ failure to announce themselves. This surprise
is what led Mendez to quickly pick up the BB gun that was beside his
bed when the officers abruptly entered.120 Had the officers announced
themselves, it is highly probably that Mendez’s “natural impulse”
would not have been to pick up his BB gun, but instead would have
115. Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1549 (2017). In its causation analysis,
the Ninth Circuit simply asserted that “an announcement that police were entering the shack would
almost certainly have ensured that Mendez was not holding his BB gun when the officers opened
the door. Had this procedure been followed, the Mendezes would not have been shot.” Mendez v.
Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016).
116. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1548–49.
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
(AM. LAW INST. 2015).
118. See, e.g., Attocknie v. Smith, 798 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Cherry’s entry of
Aaron’s home was clearly contrary to well-established law. He is not entitled to qualified immunity
on the claim of unlawful entry. And because a reasonable jury could determine that the unlawful
entry was the proximate cause of the fatal shooting of Aaron . . . we need not decide whether Cherry
used excessive force when he confronted Aaron.”).
119. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1548–49.
120. Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016).
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been to place it on the ground before allowing the officers to enter.121
“Realizing that officers were nearby, he would have likely kept his BB
gun far away from his person.”122 “Without the BB gun element,”123
the officers would not have thought Mendez was aiming a gun at them,
and would have not fired their weapons; consequently, the Mendezes
would not have been injured.124 This “direct relation between the
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged” would satisfy the
Supreme Court’s proximate cause analysis. 125
Furthermore, courts have found that knocking and announcing
one’s presence can help prevent “violent confrontations that may
occur if occupants of the home mistake law enforcement for
intruders.”126 In analyzing the causal connection between an
unconstitutional entry “which arises from intentional or reckless
conduct,” courts have also found that such entry would “proximately
cause the subsequent application of deadly force.”127
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the analysis of an unlawful entry claim and an excessive
force claim lead to the same conclusion in practice, the effect of the
Provocation Rule is not at odds with the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, an independent causation analysis of an unlawful entry
and the resulting force shows that an unlawful entry will almost
always lead to provoked force and resulting harm; this close causal
relationship is at the heart of the Provocation Rule, and supports its
constitutionality.

121. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460–461 (1948).
122. Katherine A. Macfarlane, Los Angeles v. Mendez: Proximate Cause Promise for Police
Shooting Victims, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 61 (2018).
123. Id.
124. Byrd, supra note 104 (“Each link in the causal chain was the foreseeable consequence of
its preceding link. Indeed, in McDonald v. United States, Justice Jackson discussed the ‘grave
troubles’ police may encounter after unlawfully entering a suspect’s home, including the resident’s
“natural impulse” to shoot.” (quoting McDonald, 335 U.S. at 460–461 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
125. Id.; Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1548–49 (2017).
126. United States v. Combs, 349 F.3d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 2005).
127. Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1191 (9th Cir. 2002).

